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one desire too many 
 
Abstract​: I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a                               
desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that                               
desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible                               
with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis                                   
of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that                             
their argument employs. Consequently, the argument provides no reason to doubt the popular                         
view that a desire for rightness as such is no part of virtue. I conclude by suggesting that a family of                                         
worries about merely accidentally right action presuppose one side the recent debate about                         
objectivism and perspectivism about moral rightness. 
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1. Introduction 
It is commonly alleged that desiring an act’s moral rightness as such is defective in an important                                 
way. Acting on such desires is allegedly inconsistent with moral worth, the positive moral state a                               
morally right act enjoys when its rightness is creditable to its agent. These desires are inconsistent                               
with moral worth because they are thought to alienate the agent from moral ends that merit                               
non-instrumental concern such as justice, equality, and welfare. For example, when donating to                         2
Oxfam is right because it alleviates famine, one ought not to donate simply out of a desire for the                                     
donation’s rightness as such. That’s because the single-minded pursuit of rightness, while perhaps                         
not intrinsically bad, nevertheless objectionably sidelines the end of promoting human welfare. 
 
However, the view that desires for rightness as such are defective has recently been challenged.                             
According to some, like Tom Hurka (2001, 2014), Paulina Sliwa (2015), Ron Aboodi (2017), and                             
Zoe Johnson-King (2018), desires to promote rightness as such are of value. According to a                             
particularly forceful line of argument for this position, acting with moral worth requires no desire                             
beyond a desire for rightness as such. Because agents who act with moral worth are not alienated                                 
from the ends at which morality aims, this line of argument implies that acting from a desire for                                   
rightness as such is not objectionable. The argument rests on the claim that moral worth requires                               
acting from such a desire because only then is the action’s rightness isolated from a kind of luck                                   
with which moral worth is allegedly inconsistent. This position is striking, given the past fifty years                               
of debate on desires for rightness as such. That a certain desire could be thought by some as                                   
inconsistent with moral worth and by others as a necessary condition for moral worth is a                               
powerful   testament to how poorly that desire is understood. 
 
In this paper, I defend the popular view, arguing ​that moral worth does not require a desire for                                   
rightness as such. Those who advocate these desires on the basis of the aforementioned argument                             
misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck on which their                           
1 I’m grateful to Mark Schroeder, Ralph Wedgwood, N. G. Laskowski, Zoe Johnson-King, Max Khan Hayward, 
Jessica Isserow, David Faraci, and, especially, Steve Finlay for conversations that made this paper possible. 
2  See Williams (1981) and Smith (1994) for influential early arguments. Nomy Arpaly in Arpaly and Schroeder (2014) 
and Arpaly (2015) is especially clear on this point. See also Weatherson (2014). 
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 argument relies. Consequently, their argument provides no reason to doubt the popular view that                           
a desire for rightness as such is no part of virtue.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In sections two and three, I lay some groundwork and present                                 
the argument to be rebutted. According to the argument, moral worth requires satisfying two                           
conditions: ​knowledge that the act is right and a ​desire for rightness as such. The knowledge                               
condition is thought necessary for moral worth in order to control for a certain kind of luck.                                 
Sections three to five support the claim that this kind of luck is compatible with moral worth, so                                   
there’s no need to control for it. ​Section six uncovers a controversial assumption behind how                             
advocates of motivation by rightness interpret the cases thought to motivate their view. The                           
assumption is that moral worth requires doing what’s ​objectively morally right, which does not                           
depend on our epistemic circumstances, as opposed to what’s ​subjectively morally right, which does                           
so depend. Competing accounts of moral worth do not depend on this assumption. As a result,                               
every argument against the thought that morally worthy action is objectively right action is a                             
further argument against the view that moral worth requires a desire for rightness as such. I                               
conclude by diagnosing the view’s apparent appeal and suggesting a way forward.  
 
2. Stage Setting 
Philosophers like Bernard Williams and Michael Smith are compelled by the thought that one                           
ought to care about justice, equality, and welfare for their own sakes. Merely instrumental concern                             
for these things alienates agents from, to use Smith’s phrase, the ends at which morality properly                               
aims. Clearly, justice, fairness, equality, and the like are closely connected to moral rightness. It may                               
even be the case, though it is by no means obvious, that those ends are worth desiring only because                                     
of their connection to moral rightness. For example, it may be that equality merits concern only                               
because its pursuit tends to make an act right. But even if equality’s merit is derivative on its                                   
connection to rightness, that derivativeness doesn’t diminish equality’s fitness to be desired for its                           
own sake -- or at least according to the position that I will defend.  
 
There are several motivations for this view, but one is especially simple. On this view, an act is                                   
morally right because or in virtue of the fact that the moral reasons for the act are sufficiently                                   
strong. Proponents of this view sometimes say that rightness is a ‘verdictive’ concept, since it                             
represents a verdict on the balance of reasons. On this view, acting from a desire for rightness as                                   
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 such, independently from the features of the act that make it right, is a little like desiring to get the                                       
cheap plastic trophy without caring about whether you’re the champion. The trophy is worth                           
getting only because it represents the verdict that you’re the champ. Therefore, desiring the cheap                             
plastic trophy ​as such fetishizes the trophy; it displaces your desire from its fitting object, namely,                               
the end of being the champ. Likewise for rightness. Rightness is worth caring about only in virtue                                 
of its connection to the ends at which morality properly aims like equality, welfare, and the care we                                   
owe to our friends, family, and fellow humans. 
 
The kind of motivation that Williams and Smith reject, and which I deny is necessary for moral                                 
worth, goes by several names. Williams famously rejected having a preoccupation with doing                         
what’s right as having ‘one thought too many’. Smith, for his part, distinguishes between desiring                             
to do what’s right, ​de re​, and desiring to do what’s right, ​de dicto​. Following Quine, many assume                                   
that the ​de re​/​de dicto distinction in an attitude ascription’s logical form tracks certain                           
psychological differences. However, this distinction has recently and forcefully been called into                       
doubt. I’m sympathetic to these doubts. So I’ll discuss non-instrumental desires for an act’s                           3
rightness, calling these ‘desires for rightness as such’, arguing that they are not necessary for acting                               
with moral worth. But I intend to rebut not only those who defend or advocate non-instrumental                               
de dicto desires for what’s right but also those who defend the idea that a concern for rightness is                                     
not ‘one thought too many’, though we differ in our preferred jargon. 
 
It is also common for my opponents to describe themselves as defenders of a ‘Kantian view’ of                                 
moral motivation, according to which “morally worthy actions must be performed from the                         
‘motive of duty,” or because they are right.’ I’ll leave the question of how to characterize Kant’s (as                                   4
opposed to a Kantian) understanding the motive of duty to Kant scholarship like Herman (1981),                             
Baron (1984; 1995) and Markovits (2014). Moreover, I agree with the ‘Kantian view’ insofar as it is                                 
simply the view that morally worthy acts are done because they’re right. However, I deny that                               
doing something because it’s right implies a desire for rightness as such. For example, according to                               
Julia Markovits’ non-Kantian view, acting with moral worth requires only that agents act for                           
3 See arguments in, for example, Fodor (1970), Bach (2010), and Manley and Hawthorne (2012). 
4 Markovits (2010, p.201-2). 
4 
 sufficient non-instrumental moral reasons. On many views, being a right act ​just is being an act for                                 5
which there is sufficient moral reason. As a result, her agents can be intelligibly described as doing                                 
acts because they’re right. But Markovits proposes her view as an alternative to Kantianism.                           
Consequently, it is a mistake to conflate the view that moral worth requires doing an act because it                                   
is right with the view that moral worth requires a desire for rightness as such. The ‘Kantian view’,                                   
unless stipulatively defined, seems ambiguous between these importantly distinct views. So I will                         
avoid this terminology. 
 
I’ll different terminology instead. According to a view like Markovits’s, there may be as many                             
different morally worthy motives as there are sets of sufficient moral reasons. As a result, this view                                 
is ​liberal about the motives necessary for moral worth, for it allows a great diversity of morally                                 
worthy motives. By contrast, according to the view criticized here, only one motive ever suffices for                               
moral worth: the desire for rightness as such. As a result, this view is ​conservative ​about the motives                                   
necessary for moral worth. 
 
One last ​caveat​: I aim only to rebut the claim that moral worth requires a desire for rightness as                                     
such. Officially, I take no stand on the stronger claim, suggested by Williams and Smith’s work,                               
that a desire for rightness as such is inconsistent with moral worth. Yet I am suspicious of this                                   
stronger claim because some, like Carbonell (2013) and Hurka (2014), argue that cases of ​mixed                             
motives are possible, where a desire for rightness as such is an ​additional source of moral value, over                                   
and above the value provided by desiring an act’s right-making features. There’s good reason to                             
suppose that they’re right. For example, a desire for rightness as such is of value when our desires                                   
for the ends at which morality properly aims are too weak to cause us to act. But it seems to me that                                           
desires for rightness in such cases are only instrumentally valuable, because their value derives from                             
providing a means by which agents can pursue the ends at which morality properly aims in                               
situations where that’s otherwise difficult. I suspect that those sympathetic to Smith and Williams                           
should argue that acting ​only on a desire for rightness as such is inconsistent with moral worth for                                   
only then does the agent show an objectionable disregard for the features of their act that make it                                   
right, but I will not examine this question further. 
5 I’m using ‘sufficient’ in a slightly technical sense. A set of reasons is sufficient relative to a set of countervailing                                         
reasons just when the first set is at least as weighty as the second. According to the popular view that I’m assuming, an                                             
act is right just when there is sufficient moral reason for it. 
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 3. The Rightness Condition 
According to conservatives, only acts motivated by a desire for rightness as such are                           
non-accidentally ​right. Whether an act is only accidentally right matters to whether it has moral                             
worth. Kant famously describes a shopkeeper who returns correct change because he knows that                           
his business will succeed only if it has a reputation for honesty and he wants his business to                                   
succeed. Although the shopkeeper reliably does the right thing, his act lacks moral worth. Luck has                               
a role in explaining why that’s so: given the shopkeeper’s selfish motives, it is a matter of luck that                                     
prudence and morality coincide on his action. If returning dishonest change were a more effective                             
means to help his shop succeed, he would have returned dishonest change instead. Because it is a                                 
matter of luck that prudence and morality coincide in his case, the shopkeeper’s action is only                               
accidentally right. Because it is only accidentally right, the shopkeeper’s act lacks moral worth.  
 
I agree that no morally worthy action is accidentally right. The issue is what makes a right action                                   
not merely accidentally right. Conservatives argue that only a desire for rightness as such can                             
motivate non-accidentally right action. As a result, these conservatives argue that we ought to care                             
about rightness as such and that we need not care about the features that make the act right. I will                                       
rebut this argument by showing that some right actions are not accidentally right in the way that                                 
conservatives imagine is problematic. 
 
To do so, I’ll focus on Sliwa’s (2015) argument for conservatism. When I give to Oxfam to                                 6
alleviate famine, I’ve done what’s right because I’m motivated by the very feature that makes the                               
action right. However, Sliwa argues that, despite appearances, donating to Oxfam on this motive                           
doesn’t suffice for moral worth. That because donating to Oxfam with the sole aim of alleviating                               
famine is only accidentally right, or so Sliwa claims. She writes, 
 
Consider first an agent who does the right thing and is motivated by an individual ​de re                                 
desire for the relevant right-making reason. Jean’s friend missed her bus to work and frets                             
over being late to an important meeting; coming late would be a great embarrassment to                             
her. Wanting to spare her friend a major embarrassment, Jean gives her a ride. Let’s assume                               
6 My rebuttal to her argument also answers others who also advocate desires for rightness as such from concerns about                                       
accidentality, such as Johnson-King (2018). Johnson-King’s view is weaker than Sliwa’s for it does hold that moral                                 
worth requires knowledge that an act is right. However, the cases that I will use to argue against conservatism  
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 that giving her friend the ride is the right thing to do in these circumstances and the fact                                   
that it spares her friend a major embarrassment makes it right. Thus, Jean is acting from a                                 
de re desire for a right-making reason. Does Jean’s action have moral worth? A central                             
feature of morally worthy actions is that they are not merely accidentally right. Given                           
Jean’s motivation, it’s not a fluke that Jean spared her friend a major embarrassment. But it                               
is a fluke that she did the right thing. (6)  
 
The case illustrates an important contrast between motivation by right-making features and                       
motivation by rightness as such. On a commonsense Rossian picture, which I will grant, our duty                               
proper is determined by competition between conflicting ​prima facie or ​pro tanto duties. Though                           
sparing my friend embarrassment contributes to my help’s moral rightness, whether my help is                           
morally right depends on competition between other factors, like whether by giving my friend a lift                               
I fail to save my neighbor’s life. In sum, whether a right-making feature is sufficient depends on                                 
competition with other, countervailing features. An act’s moral rightness therefore differs from its                         
right-making features by ​always​ being morally sufficient for the act.  
 
Sliwa argues that this difference between right-making features and rightness as such affects the                           
moral value of the motives to which they give rise. According to her, unless Jean ​knows that helping                                   
her friend is right, her act is risky. The fact that helping the friend saves her embarrassment may                                   
not, in fact, succeed in making the action right. Though saving a friend embarrassment contributes                             
to the act’s rightness, it is an unreliable motivational basis for doing what’s morally right. Thus, just                                 
as Kant’s shopkeeper fails to act with moral worth because his act is only accidentally morally right,                                 
Jean fails to act with moral worth because her motivating reasons are only accidentally ​sufficient                             
moral reasons.  
 
Morally worthy action is incompatible with merely luckily right action. According to Sliwa, Jean’s                           
action is only luckily right because her motivating reasons could easily fail to be sufficient moral                               
reasons. Given that Jean’s action is only accidentally morally right, Sliwa concludes that it lacks                             
moral worth. According to her view, an actually right act lacks moral worth because of (what I’ll                                 
call) ​sufficiency luck​ when its motivating reasons could easily fail to be sufficient moral reasons.   7
 
7 In Sliwa’s terminology, a morally worthy act’s rightness must be “counterfactually robust.” (2015, p.9) 
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 Sliwa offers the ​Rightness Condition as an analysis of the motives that are necessary and sufficient                               
for moral worth. According to it, an agent acts with moral worth just in case she knows that the act                                       
is right and desires rightness as such. Knowledge that an act is right defeats sufficiency luck because                                 
knowledge is ​safe and when a belief is safe, it is true in nearby worlds. If an agent knows that an act                                           
is right, then it is not wrong in nearby worlds. So an act motivated by knowledge that it’s right                                     
could not easily be wrong, which answers worries about sufficiency luck. And only a desire for                               
what’s right motivates an action on the basis of what insulates it from sufficiency luck. So it                                 
appears that only satisfying the Rightness Condition is an adequate bulwark against sufficiency                         
luck. 
 
Johnson-King also defends a form of conservatism about morally worthy motives according to                         
which moral worth requires deliberately doing what’s right as such. Johnson-King’s view is                         8
conservative for it denies moral worth to deliberately doing what’s compassionate, loving, or caring                           
in the absence of a desire for rightness as such. Her argument for this view, however, does not rely                                     
on the claim that moral worth requires knowledge that the act is right; rather, it relies on the                                   
weaker claim that moral worth requires the ​belief that the act is right. I aim to rebut this form of                                       9
conservatism as well, showing that morally worthy action does not require the belief that the act is                                 
right. As a result, the examples that follow involve agents who not only lack knowledge, but also                                 
the relevant beliefs. Doing so rebuts both Sliwa and Johnson-King’s versions of conservatism.                         
Nevertheless, I’ll continue to use Sliwa’s Rightness Condition as my main foil. 
 
4. Footballing Wisdom, Musical Wisdom, and Practical Wisdom 
As an antidote to sufficiency luck, Sliwa prescribes the Rightness Condition, according to which                           
an act has moral worth just when and because its agent knows that it’s right and they desire                                   
rightness as such. This section focuses on rebutting Sliwa’s argument for desiring rightness as such                             
from the claim that only knowledge eliminates sufficiency luck. I’ll do this by showing that other                               
mastery, which, like moral worth, are incompatible with luck, do not depend on conditions                           
8 Johnson-King (2018, p.16). 
9 In Johnson-King’s words, if the agent has ‘no idea’ that an act is right, then their acting that way lacks moral worth.                                             
She uses this phrase to express the thought that Huck Finn ‘has no belief that his act is right “anywhere in his head”.’                                             
I’ll discuss the attitude of belief rather than that of having an idea for the discussion of Arpaly and Markovits on p.12                                           
of Johnson-King (2018) shows that having no belief that an act is right implies having no idea that it is right. Because                                           
my arguments show that moral worth does not imply the belief that an act is right, they also show that moral worth                                           
does not imply any logically stronger attitude, such as knowledge or ‘having an idea’. 
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 parallel to the Rightness Condition. Doing so suggests that the condition is false. I’ll build on this                                 
suggestion in subsequent sections. 
 
Sliwa’s analysis of moral worth is implausible when generalized to other kinds of mastery. We can                               
construct a principle parallel to the Rightness Condition for masterful footballing, rather than                         
morally worthy action, and hold that a particular play is masterful just when and because it is                                 
motivated by a desire to make a great play and knowledge that the play is great. Just as some acts are                                         
morally right, some strikes or plays in football are great. And just as we can distinguish acts that are                                     
only accidentally right from those that are non-accidentally right, we can distinguish football plays                           
that are only accidentally great from those that are non-accidentally great -- that is, from masterful                               
plays. For example, I am not a talented footballer. Were I ever to make a great play in a football                                       
match, it would be entirely by accident. But that’s not true of everyone. Imagine a fictional                               
footballer named Renaldo. Renaldo is a legend in his own time but he is extremely humble.                               
Renaldo is legendary for his prescient vision on the pitch and his ability to judge -- with pinpoint                                   
accuracy -- the speed, position, and trajectory of the ball and all the players, which lets him realize                                   
plays unimaginable to us footballing mortals. Owing to both peerless natural talent and the                           
tutelage of his pleasant, attacking-football oriented Coach Hourinmo, every time Renaldo touches                       
the ball, magic happens.  
 
However, despite the unquestioned greatness of his footballing, Renaldo does not believe that his                           
plays are great. Because he is humble, he simply does not conceive of them in those terms. Indeed,                                   
Renaldo’s stratospheric standards for great footballing lead him to believe that his plays are ​not                             
great. In post-game interviews, when asked about how he manages to produce great football night                             
in and night out, Renaldo replies, “I do not think about great football. Thoughts about great                               
football are nowhere in my head. I just try to put the ball in the net or to help my teammates do                                           
so.” But Renaldo’s great footballing is no accident; it is the product of training and talent and hard                                   
work. When blazing a free kick fifty metres out from the net into its top corner, he’ll deny that the                                       
play was great and insist it was merely the best play available to him. When volleying a pass from his                                       
box to an attacking player most of the way up the pitch, he’ll simply respond that he likes making                                     
those kinds of plays in those situations because those plays tend to result in goals. 
 
9 
 This case makes trouble for the generalized version of Sliwa’s principle. Renaldo does not believe                             
that his football plays are great -- he is too humble for that. But it would be a mistake to deny, on                                           
that basis, that Renaldo’s plays are masterful. Given Renaldo’s training and talent, whether he                           
plays masterfully does not depend on whether he believes that his plays are great. The same is true                                   
of morally worthy actions. They don’t require that the agent believe that they’re right.  
 
This isn’t an idiosyncratic feature of athletic mastery. Consider a music tip often given to budding                               
songwriters is “Don’t write the song; let the song write itself.” The tip recommends a certain way                                 
of engaging in songwriting: don’t go about self-consciously searching for a beautiful melody.                         
Rather, just attend to the melodies that come naturally to you in a quiet moment, figure them out,                                   
and then, with some training and talent, eventually one of those melodies will form the basis of a                                   
beautiful song. As a result, what explains a songwriter’s focus when developing a particular melody                             
need not be the belief that it’s beautiful; that belief need not be anywhere in her head. The                                   
songwriter may simply find the melody intriguing. To be sure, successful songwriters are ones that                             
are intrigued by what’s beautiful. But here we should read ‘what’s beautiful’ with ​de re and not ​de                                   
dicto scope. It would thus be a mistake to insist that the songwriter intrigued by a beautiful melody                                   
believes that the melody is beautiful. Likewise, it would be a mistake to claim that this songwriter                                 
desires to write beautiful songs as such. But it’s no accident when a practiced and gifted songwriter                                 
creates a beautiful melody, even when beauty is not the songwriter’s focus or aim, much less their                                 
overriding motivation for creating the melody.  10
 
Indeed, we should not be surprised that knowledge that an act has some quality is generally                               
unnecessary for the act to have that quality non-accidentally, even moral rightness, ​contra Sliwa.                           
The case presented by Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn is central to discussions of moral worth.                             11
10 I can imagine a rebuttal to these two cases from someone convinced by the positions in Star (2008, 2011, 2015).                                         
Much like the chicken-sexer knows that a particular chick is male without introspective access to his grounds for that                                     
belief, proponents of this rebuttal could assert that Renaldo and the songwriter ​in fact have the relevant knowledge,                                   
though they lack introspective access to it. Although this conjecture is consistent with my description of the cases, it is                                       
not entailed by those descriptions. So there’s nothing wrong with stipulating that the footballer and songwriter lack                                 
the introspectively opaque beliefs that constitute the relevant knowledge. It’s also important to stress the degree to                                 
which this rebuttal is tethered to the reasons as evidence thesis, the thesis that for some consideration to be reason to                                         
act in some way is for that consideration to be evidence that one ought to act in that way, which is advanced in Kearns                                               
and Star (2008, 2009). For example, Star explicitly states that ​his argument for externalism about moral knowledge                                 
depends on reasons as evidence in (2011, pp.84-7). Engaging with this argument takes me too far astray, so I’ll merely                                       
note that the reasons as evidence thesis is contentious and that any argument that relies on reasons as evidence as a                                         
premise is at least as controversial. 
11 See, ​inter alia​, Bennett (1974) and Arpaly (2000, 2002). 
10 
 According to Twain’s novel, Huck, a boy living in the Antebellum American south, lets an escaped                               
slave he befriends, Jim, evade capture despite believing that slaves are property and that letting a                               
slave go free is wrong because it is tantamount to theft. Importantly, this moment comes at a                                 
climax in the book, after Huck and Jim share several adventures as travellers on the Mississippi that                                 
bond them as friends. It is commonly thought that Huck’s behaviour towards Jim is morally                             
worthy. Accordingly, the case is commonly thought to show that believing that an act is right is                                 
not necessary for acting with moral worth. However, Sliwa’s Rightness Condition implies that                         
such beliefs are necessary. Consequently, the Huck Finn case is a challenge to views like Sliwa’s.  
 
Sliwa acknowledges the need to rebut the case, beginning by favourably quoting the claim in                             
Arpaly (2003, 78) that “Huckleberry Finn [. . .] is not a bad boy who has accidentally done                                   
something good, but a good boy.” Her rebuttal depends on distinguishing good character from                           
moral worth. Sliwa is happy to grant that Huck Finn has good character. But that judgment is                                 
consistent with the fact that some of his acts lack moral worth. Common judgments about the                               
Huck Finn case are consistent with the Rightness Condition, Sliwa claims. The former concern a                             
property of character and the latter concerns a property of actions. 
 
But we cannot treat character and action wholly independently for action is normally the product                             
of character. As we’ve just seen with music and football, a person’s character, or more broadly,                               12
their dispositions, bear on whether their acts have certain qualities only accidentally. A footballer’s                           
training and talent bear on whether their footballing is only accidentally great. A musician’s ‘ear’                             
bears on whether their songs are only accidentally beautiful. Consequently, judgements about                       
Huck Finn’s character are not wholly independent from judgments about the moral worth of his                             
actions. The analogy with sporting and musical mastery gives us reason to suspect that when a                               
moral agent has the right upbringing or, like Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, goes through a morally                             
enlightening experience, their right actions are non-accidentally right -- even if they, like Finn, lack                             
the belief that they act rightly. It’s not dumb luck that Huck’s appreciation of Jim’s humanity                               
12 I acknowledge that it’s possible to act out of character -- see Hurka (2006). What’s important for me is that,                                         
normally, how we act depends on our character so the two are not wholly independent. Indeed, it’s hard to make sense                                         
of the notion of character if it has absolutely no bearing on how we normally act. Here I intend ‘character’ in a broader                                             
sense than is normal in, for example, virtue ethics. As a result, my use is compatible with the situationist critique of                                         
character as it is used by some virtue ethicists -- see, for example, Harman (1999) for an influential articulation of this                                         
critique. 
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 moves him to let Jim go free. That’s because Huck Finn’s morally right action manifests his good                                 
character by being caused by it. For that reason, the act is non-accidentally right.  
 
In sum, ensuring that an act non-accidentally instantiates some normative property -- be it moral                             
rightness, footballing greatness, or musical beauty -- does ​not​, in general, require a desire for that                               
property as such or knowledge that the particular act has that property. This should make us                               
suspicious of the Rightness Condition. I’ll now show where I think Sliwa’s argument goes wrong,                             
namely, by assuming that the sufficiency luck that attends an act’s motives makes that act only                               
accidentally right. Consequently, it is unsurprising that our judgments about the moral worth of                           
Huck Finn’s actions follow a general pattern manifest across a wide range of human pursuits like                               
music and sport. 
 
5. Sufficiency Luck Ignores Agency 
We should be suspicious about the relevance of sufficiency luck. Other kinds of behaviour are                             
susceptible to sufficiency luck. But that susceptibility does not justify restricting the reasons for                           
those behaviours in the way that the Rightness Condition restricts moral reasons for action. For                             
example, just as an act has sufficiency luck when its motivating reasons are only contingently                             
sufficient for the act’s rightness, we might say that a belief has sufficiency luck when the reasons for                                   
which the agent has the belief are only contingently sufficient for that belief’s propositional                           
justification. Many reasons for belief are only contingently sufficient for propositional                     
justification. For example, that it appears that I have hands is sufficiently strong evidence to justify                               
my belief that I have hands. But this sufficiency is only contingent: that it appears that I have hands                                     
is not sufficient for justifiedly believing that I do when I suspect that I’m an envatted brain or the                                     
victim of demonic deception. If Sliwa’s concerns about sufficiency luck were general, then any                           
belief that I have hands that is based on perceptual evidence would be only luckily right -- it’s lucky                                     
that I wasn’t a brain in a vat. Knowledge, like moral worth, is incompatible with luck.                               
Consequently, we cannot know that we have hands on perceptual evidence given sufficiency luck.                           
But that’s an overly sceptical conclusion.  
 
Sliwa’s Rightness Condition is the product of a similarly excessive scepticism. Sliwa is sceptical that                             
an agent like Jean could consistently and deliberately act rightly without a desire for rightness as                               
such. I’ll now argue that this scepticism is excessive for it results from falsely assuming that                               
12 
 sufficiency luck is incompatible with moral worth. But just as sufficiency luck is compatible with                             
at least perceptual knowledge, it is also compatible with moral worth. 
 
Sufficiency luck exploits how sufficiency is often an only contingent property of normative                         
reasons. It may not be a matter of circumstance whether a set of facts is right-making, but it is                                     13
often contingent whether a set of right-making reasons is morally sufficient. That’s because                         
sufficiency isn’t an intrinsic feature of most right-making reasons; it also depends on the weight or                               
strength of countervailing reasons. Given that a motivating reason’s moral sufficiency is normally                         
only contingent, it is often possible for the agent’s actually right action to be wrong in nearby                                 
worlds, holding their motivating reasons constant across modal space. Sliwa argues that knowledge                         
that an act is right eliminates the act’s sufficiency luck because knowledge is ​safe​. When one knows                                 
that one’s act is right, there are no nearby worlds where bad luck makes one’s act wrong, for, ​a                                     
fortiori​, there are no nearby worlds where one’s act is wrong. As a result, because moral worth                                 
requires something like safety, moral worth requires something like knowledge that an act is right                             
and motivation based on that knowledge. 
 
However, this argument depends on a subtle shift from reasons to actions. Moral worth is a                               
property of an agent’s ​action ​only when they could not have easily acted wrongly. Sufficiency luck                               
is a property of a ​moral reasons when they could easily be insufficient. Consequently, the argument                               
must connect reasons to action. In particular, it must show that sufficiency luck and moral worth                               
are incompatible by showing that having merely contingently sufficient motivating reasons entails                       
that the agent could easily have acted wrongly -- that is, that they act wrongly in nearby worlds. But                                     
this implication holds only if the agent’s motivating reasons don’t change in nearby worlds. That                             
is, for a set of moral reasons’ sufficiency luck to undermine an actually right act’s moral worth,                                 
Sliwa must assume that the agent would act for those reasons in nearby worlds. Only then does it                                   
follow that the agent acts wrongly in nearby worlds, so they could easily have actually acted                               
wrongly. Only then would the agent’s act lack moral worth.  
 
Let me make this point concrete. The moral reason for Jean to give her a friend a lift is that it                                         
would save the friend from embarrassment. Because giving the lift is actually right, the moral                             
13 Although Dancy (2004) argues that, for example, an act’s benevolence contributes to its being right is contingent. 
Facts can change their moral valance so that benevolence can be a wrong-making feature in some circumstances. 
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 reason for doing so is actually sufficient. But the reason isn’t necessarily sufficient -- it can be                                 
defeated by weightier countervailing reasons. For example, suppose that, in a nearby world, Jean’s                           
car is broken and that giving the lift requires Jean to steal a car. In that circumstance, that it would                                       
save her friend embarrassment is not a sufficient reason for Jean to give the friend a lift. Jean has a                                       
much stronger reason not to give the lift since doing so requires stealing a car.  
 
Jean’s motive of saving her friend embarrassment is therefore subject to sufficiency luck. But                           
sufficiency luck implies that Jean’s lift lacks moral worth only if it implies that the rightness of                                 
Jean’s acts is modally fragile. That it, sufficiency luck is relevant to moral worth only if it implies                                   
Jean acts wrongly in nearby worlds. In this example, it depends on whether Jean would steal the car                                   
to give her friend the lift. If Jean would, then that ​does seem to undermine the moral worth of her                                       
actual actions. However, if she wouldn’t, then whether her actually morally sufficient motives are                           
defeated in nearby worlds is irrelevant. And it seems fair to assume that she wouldn’t. In short,                                 
defeating considerations undermine the actual moral worth of an agent’s actions only if they also                             
lead the agent astray in nearby worlds. Perhaps Sliwa might protest that broken-car worlds are not                               
nearby. But, as I’ll argue in the following section, the same point holds for more subtle departures                                 
from actuality -- I’ve merely assumed a less subtle departure here to highlight the important point. 
 
In sum, Sliwa must assume that the agent’s actual motivating reasons are their motivating reasons                             
in nearby worlds for her argument to succeed. ​But we shouldn’t do so: fixing an agent’s motivating                                 
reasons excludes the agent’s agency from Sliwa’s picture of moral worth. After all, good agents are                               
sensitive to changes in their environment. When their environment changes, their motives change.                         
Rather, if sufficiency luck is to bear on the moral worth of an agent’s intentional action, we need to                                     
consider the agent’s entire motivational state, including her desires and perspective on her                         
situation, and check whether her actions and motives at nearby worlds are right in those worlds. It                                 
may be that her actual motivating reasons are insufficient in those nearby worlds. But, her ​actual                               
motivating reasons needn’t be her ​counterfactual ​motivating reasons.  
 
An example makes vivid the error behind assuming that the agent’s actual motivating reasons are                             
their motivating reasons in nearby worlds. When a footballer makes a masterful play, sometimes                           
the play is great partly because it’s risky; it would have gone badly wrong had the player played even                                     
slightly differently. This kind of situation is analogous to Jean’s case: just as the features that                               
14 
 actually make her act right could easily fail to make it right in nearby worlds, the features that                                   
actually make a play great -- the spin of the ball, the position of the players, the timing of the shot,                                         
etc. -- could easily have been different. If we hold the player’s actual bodily movements fixed and                                 
evaluate nearby possibilities where the state of play is slightly different, the play fails to be great in                                   
many of those nearby worlds. For example, if the ball had landed one centimetre to the left and the                                     
player had kicked the ball just as they did actually, then the shot would have gone wide of the net.                                       
But the fact that the ball could have easily landed differently doesn’t undermine the actual play’s                               
greatness when the player would have played the ball appropriately had it landed differently. It                             
doesn’t make sense to hold the players’ actual bodily movements fixed when evaluating the play’s                             
mastery. What matters is how the players acted and would have acted were the state of play                                 
different. We should evaluate whether Jean acts with moral worth by just the same standard. It                               
doesn’t matter that her actual motives could have led her astray in other situations just as long as                                   
her counterfactual motives are the right ones to have, relative to those worlds. To be sure, much                                 
more needs to be said to identify ​which counterfactual motives those are, and which counterfactual                             
worlds matter, in order to mount a satisfactory analysis of moral worth. But the point is that such                                   
an account appears to be a viable alternative to Sliwa’s. As such, satisfying the Rightness Condition                               
is not necessary for moral worth. 
 
In sum, Sliwa’s argument mistakenly presupposes that the merely contingent implication from an                         
act’s right-making features to its moral rightness undermines the moral worth of motivation by                           
those features. The concern behind this presupposition is that agents who act on only contingently                             
sufficient moral reasons could easily act wrongly on the basis of those very reasons. But this                               
concern is mistaken. Not every such agent could easily act wrongly. In particular, it’s no accident                               
when a good agent acts rightly. That’s because good agents track shifts in the balance of their moral                                   
reasons; that is, roughly, that they are disposed cease intending an action when the moral reasons                               
for it cease to be sufficient.   14
14 One might worry that tracking moral reasons in this way requires a desire for rightness as such or something like it.                                           
For my money, this is where the heart of the debate lies. But this very question arises in a nearby debate about                                           
judgment internalism, the view that moral judgments intrinsically motivate. In Smith (1994), Michael Smith is also                               
concerned to explain why the intentions of good and strong-willed persons track changes in their beliefs about what’s                                   
right. Smith contrasts two alternative explanations of the phenomenon. One is judgment internalism, the view that                               
moral judgments are intrinsically motivating, at least in rational persons. Another is that good and strong willed                                 
persons have a desire for rightness as such. Smith rejects the second explanation because it attributes to good and strong                                       
willed agents a desire that alienates them from the ends at which morality properly aims. Rather, Smith concludes,                                   
judgment internalism is true.  
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6. Tracking Subjective Moral Reasons 
We have good grounds for resisting Sliwa’s argument for conservatism. It is sound only if                             
motivation by merely contingently sufficient moral reasons entails that the agent risks acting                         
wrongly, which would undermine the moral worth of her action. But that entailment doesn’t hold                             
because some agents are the moral analogues of talented footballers. Talented footballers track, in a                             
manner that falls short of belief, the merely contingent great-making features of their plays; because                             
they do, it’s not dumb luck when they play masterfully. Likewise, some good moral agents track                               
the merely contingent moral sufficiency of their motives without the corresponding beliefs;                       
because they do, it’s not dumb luck when they act rightly.  
 
This discussion foregrounds the question of what it takes to track one’s moral reasons and to be a                                   
good person. My claims so far allow for the possibility that tracking one’s moral reasons is very                                 
difficult, requiring them to adjudicate between extremely subtle differences in the balance of                         
reasons or to know the unforeseeable consequences of their actions. This would makes acting with                             
moral worth correspondingly demanding. I can see how concerns subtle differences between the                         
strength of one’s moral reasons could push someone like Sliwa towards conservatism. However, as                           
I’ll now argue, such concern applies only to a controversial kind of rightness. Tracking other kinds                               
of rightness isn’t as demanding. 
 
Recall the case of Jean, which Sliwa uses to motivate her view. Sliwa claims, “given Jean’s                               
motivation, it’s not a fluke that Jean spared her friend a major embarrassment. But it is a fluke that                                     
she did the right thing.” (6) The second sentence is ambiguous in an important way. It is often                                   
assumed that there are two kinds of moral rightness, ​subjective and ​objective​. What’s subjectively                           
right depends on our information, whereas what’s objectively right does not. When the evidence                           
appears to indicate that A is the antidote but, in fact, appearances are misleading and B is the                                   
Some judgment externalists, those who reject judgment internalism, have responded to Smith’s argument by                           
identifying other ways for an agent’s intention to do what’s right to track their belief that the act is right, which don’t                                           
involve a desire for rightness as such. Responding to Sliwa’s argument puts us in precisely the same camp as the                                       
judgment externalists. We want to explain how an agent’s intentions to do what’s right could covary non-accidentally                                 
with their perspective on what’s right without appealing to a desire for rightness as such. This lets us take a page from                                           
the externalist’s book to answer the worry. In particular, we can take a page from Brink (1997), Copp (1997), and                                       
Dreier (2000), and appeal to a second-order desire to desire to do what’s right. I haven’t the space to develop this                                         
proposal in any detail here, though I take some steps towards this account in the conclusion and in Howard (2018),                                       
Howard (forthcoming), and Howard (manuscript). Suffice to say that it’s not clear that tracking moral reasons’                               
sufficiency requires a desire for rightness as such. 
16 
 antidote, administering A is ​subjectively right but administering B is ​objectively right. Moreover,                         
because reasons and rightness are intimately connected, it is often assumed that there are ​subjective                             
moral reasons, which bear on the first kind of rightness, and ​objective moral reasons, which bear on                                 
the second.  
 
This distinction between kinds of rightness matters to the debate between liberals and                         
conservatives about moral worth. As I’ll now argue, it is a fluke that Jean did the right thing ​only in                                       
the sense of objective rightness. That’s because, in contrast with objective rightness, what is                           
subjectively right depends on our information. The precise nature of that dependence is                         
controversial. There is general agreement that your subjective moral reasons, and, hence, what’s                         
subjectively right for you, depend on your epistemic perspective. But there is disagreement about                           
what features of an agent constitute their perspective. Philosophers defend views according to                         
which that perspective is, variously, a function of your evidence, of what you’re in a position to                                 
know, of what you believe, of your know-how, etc. I’ll take no stand on what constitutes an                                 15
agent’s perspective in the sense relevant to subjective rightness and reasons. But because what’s                           
subjectively right depends on our perspective, there is a certain sense in which it is rarely a fluke                                   
when we do what’s subjectively right. That’s because our perspective partly determines both                         
whether the act is right ​and ​whether it’s a fluke that the act is right.  
 
In particular, we can draw the conclusion that it’s no fluke that Jean did what was subjectively                                 
right from a principle and a dilemma. The principle is that if Jean has a decisive subjective reason to                                     
help her friend, then she has sufficient reason to believe that helping her friend is right. The                                 16
dilemma is that either Jean has sufficient reason to believe that helping her friend is right or she                                   
doesn’t. 
 
If Jean ​does have sufficient reason to believe that helping her friend is right, then it is not a fluke                                       
that she did what’s subjectively right. That’s because in all or nearly all cases, evidence that an act is                                     
morally right also provides a moral reason to act that way. Jean has good evidence that the act was                                     17
15 Williamson (2000) defends the first condition; Gibbons (2013) defends the second; Schroeder (2007) defends the 
third; Lord (2018) defends the fourth. 
16 The principle closely related to Kiesewetter (2016)’s “Principle of Decisive Reasons,” according to which if A has 
decisive reason to φ, then A has sufficient reason to believe that she herself has decisive reason to φ. 
17 It is widely assumed that there is a strong connection between evidence that an act is right and moral reasons to act                                             
that way. Indeed, some, such as Kearns and Star (2009), argue that a reason for action is moral just when and because                                           
17 
 right given by the fact that the lift would spare the friend embarrassment. That piece of evidence                                 
also gives Jean a moral reason to give the lift. Of course, if Jean were indifferent to saving her friend                                       
embarrassment, yet gave her a lift for some other reason, like to be able to use the carpool lane, then                                       
it would indeed be a fluke that her act is right. In this case, Jean would be like Kant’s shopkeeper,                                       
whose honest dealings with his customers are a fluke because of the coincidence that prudence and                               
morality both recommend giving honest change. But we needn’t assume that what Jean does is                             
unaffected by her moral evidence and the moral reasons for acting provided by said evidence.                             
Rather, as Sliwa tells us, Jean is the kind of person who is willing to go out of her way to save her                                             
friend from embarrassment. Assuming that Jean is a good person, she will not be insensitive to her                                 
evidence about what’s right and the moral reasons it provides. And, given that her act is                               
subjectively right, her evidence indicates that the act is right. So it’s no fluke that she does it.  
 
However, if, on the other horn of the dilemma, Jean didn’t have sufficient reason to believe that                                 
helping her friend was right, then she didn’t have decisive reason to help her friend, given                               
perspectivism. If she didn’t have decisive reason to help her friend, then it wasn’t subjectively right                               
for her to do so. So, ​a fortiori​, it wasn’t a fluke that it was subjectively right for her to do so. In                                             
particular, if Jean didn’t act rightly, then the case offers no pressure to abandon more liberal views                                 
of moral worth, like that of Markovits (2010), to which the Rightness Condition offers an                             
alternative, since these views require that an agent act rightly to act with moral worth.  
 
Consequently, the ​only sense in which it could be said that it’s a fluke that Jean acted rightly is in                                       
the objective sense of ‘right’. To be sure, the dilemma I’ve just presented depends on a principle,                                 
which encodes a particular way of thinking about subjective rightness. But verifying ​something like                           
that principle is characteristic of, and essential to, subjective rightness. I conjecture that we can run                               
the same dilemma using whatever principle is in fact correct, if it isn’t the one I’ve used. So Sliwa’s                                     
argument for the Rightness Condition presupposes that acting with moral worth implies doing                         
what’s ​objectively ​right, rather than what’s ​subjectively​ right.  
 
it’s evidence of moral rightness. But we can assume a much weaker connection than the one that Kearns and Star                                       
defend. I’ve included the hedge ‘nearly all’ to avoid a challenge to the stronger thesis from moral testimony, which                                     
appears to provide moral evidence but may not provide moral reasons. For more, see Hills (2009) and Howard (2018). 
18 
 By presupposing that moral worth requires objective not subjective rightness, conservatives about                       
moral worth adopt controversial commitments in the debate between ​perspectivists about moral                       
rightness, according to whom an agent’s epistemic circumstances affect their obligations, and                       
objectivists about moral rightness, according to whom an agent’s epistemic circumstances do not                         
affect their obligations. The requirements of moral worth look very different from the differing                           18
standpoints of subjective and objective rightness. From the standpoint of objective rightness,                       
adopting something like the Rightness Condition makes more sense. The truths that constitute                         
objective rightness are like any other mind-independent truths, such as mathematical or                       
meteorological truths. Proper engagement with those truths means properly conforming one’s                     
inner life to external reality. Since knowledge is the gold-standard of belief, it’s natural to suppose                               
that moral worth, the gold-standard of action, requires knowledge. Without knowledge, our moral                         
acts look reckless and morally worthy acts are surely not reckless.  19
 
But from the standpoint of subjective rightness, the Rightness Condition looks, at best, a little like                               
overkill and, at worst, a lot like a form of moral fetishism. If an act is subjectively right, then you                                       
have conclusive evidence that it’s right. In most or all cases, evidence that an act is right also gives                                     
moral reasons to perform the act. Those are the only moral reasons you need to track in order to do                                       
what’s subjectively right. As a result, what’s subjectively right is, of its essence, ​detectable and                             
within the agent’s ken. Insofar as we desire the ends at which morality properly aims -- fairness,                                 
justice, equality, and the like -- we can’t easily go subjectively wrong when we’re good people.                               
That’s because it’s much easier to look for something that, by its nature, shifts to ensure that it can                                     
be found. Because subjective moral truths are looking to be found, so to speak, tracking them is                                 
much easier than tracking mathematical or meteorological truths. 
 
The case of Jean is initially compelling because what’s objectively right depends on competition                           
between the reasons for and against an action. It makes sense to suppose that the outcomes of that                                   
competition are sometimes only narrowly decided. But narrowly decided outcomes are, by their                         
nature, difficult to discern. So it may be difficult to discern what’s objectively right when                             
18 For arguments supporting perspectivism, see Kiesewetter (2011, 2016, 2018), McHugh and Way (2017), Way and                               
Whiting (2017), Lord (2018), and Littlejohn (fc). For arguments supporting objectivism, see Thomson (1990, 2007)                             
and Graham (2010). 
19 There’s an interesting question of whether moral worth requires knowledge, or whether lesser states like justified 
belief will do. I won’t address that question here. For more, see Sverdlik (2001). 
19 
 competition between objective moral reasons is close. We must discern well for it not to be a fluke                                   
that we act well. And when we discern well, we know.  
 
But shifts in the balance of sufficient ​subjective moral reasons are not, at least normally, too subtle                                 
to be reliably detected for if you have decisive subjective reason to do something, then you also                                 
have sufficient reason to believe it. Therefore, if competition between subjective moral reasons                         
favours a certain outcome, then you have sufficient reason to believe that the competition favours                             
that outcome. Normally, shifts in the balance of sufficient moral reasons are detectable. The                           
margin for error in cases like Jean’s is, therefore, ​much wider than might be initially supposed. It’s                                 
much easier for one’s intentions to track the sufficiency of one’s subjective moral reasons than of                               
one’s objective moral reasons. In that sense it’s no fluke that Jean does what’s right. 
 
Nothing I’ve said so far should be controversial to conservatives. I’ve merely shown how cases like                               
Jean’s motivate conservatism only if perspectivism is false. But this is a significant drawback. It                             
means that ​every argument for perspectivism about rightness is an argument against the motivating                           
for conservatism. By contrast, liberal views like that of Markovits are, at least in principle,                             
consistent with both subjective and objective conceptions of rightness. That’s a significant                       
advantage. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I’ve examined a compelling but ultimately unsuccessful argument for conservatism about moral                       
worth. According to the argument, acting with moral worth requires knowledge that an act is right                               
and to control for sufficiency luck. I’ve argued that moral worth does not require such knowledge                               
because moral worth is compatible with sufficiency luck.  
 
Despite rejecting the Rightness Condition and suggesting that other forms of conservatism are                         
equally unacceptable, I think that the Condition contains an important kernel of truth, which                           
points to where progress can be made and which explains why a single motive could, puzzlingly, be                                 
thought by some as inconsistent with moral worth and by others as required by moral worth.                               
According to Markovits, simplifying somewhat, an act has moral worth just when its motivating                           
reasons are sufficient moral reasons. This implies that since moral reasons are facts, then motivating                             
20 
 reasons must be too. As a result, to get a sense of the quality of an agent’s motives, it suffices to                                         
identify the facts that move them to act intentionally.  
 
But that can’t be right. For example, you can't tell whether someone is a Cubs fan just from the                                     
fact that the reason why they're going to Wrigley Field is that the Cubs are playing. After all, they                                     
could be going to Wrigley Field to see the Cubs win ​or ​to see them lose. Likewise, the fact that                                       
someone is hurt often provides sufficient moral grounds to help them. But that fact can move a                                 
selfish person to help only for the praise that their help will garner, so that their help will lack moral                                       
worth. In short, just as being motivated to go to Wrigley Field by the fact that the Cubs are playing                                       
doesn't suffice to make you a Cubs fan, being motivated to do what's right by a right-making                                 
reason doesn't suffice to act with moral worth. Markovits covers cases like this with an injunction                               
against instrumental reasons. But I think the cases point to something deeper. 
 
Rather, possessing a good motive involves ​two components: it involves being moved by the right                             20
facts and desiring the right ​goals​. Although, the Cubs fan and the Cubs hater both go to Wrigley                                   
because the Cubs are playing, only the fan goes to see the Cubs win. Likewise, the virtuous person                                   
and the selfish person's goals differ when they help someone because they're hurt. Only the selfish                               
person helps in order to garner praise. The virtuous person helps, we might suppose, to alleviate                               
the victim’s pain. The Rightness Condition’s two conditions correspond to these two components                         
of good motives, namely, facts and goals. Because its two components state conditions on the facts                               
and goals behind morally worthy action, it has the right form to capture the concept of moral                                 
worth.  
 
Supposing that motives are composed of ​two entities, facts and goals, it’s worth asking whether                             
doing something because it’s right concerns the first or second component -- that is, does it involve                                 
being moved by the fact that an act is right ​or being moved by the goal of doing what’s right. I                                         
conjecture that this question is at the heart of the debate between Sliwa/Johnson-King and                           
Smith/Williams. Sliwa and Johnson-King argue that moral worthy action requires, at a minimum,                         
the belief that the act is right. This corresponds to the first component of some good motives. But                                   
Smith and Williams seem concerned with the second component, that is, with the agent’s aim or                               
20 Characterizing motivating reasons in terms of ​two​ components is an old point, familiar from Davidson (1963) and, 
ultimately, the motivational psychology associated with David Hume. 
21 
 goal in action. For Smith and Williams, only if the agent’s ultimate aim in acting is the promotion                                   
of rightness itself is the agent objectionably alienated from the ends that merit proper moral                             
concern, like “honesty, the weal and woe of [one's] children and friends, the well-being of [one's]                               
fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice, equality, and the like” (Smith 1994, p.75). As                             
such, there is, in principle, a middle view that reconciles Smith and Williams’ arguments with those                               
of Sliwa and Johnson-King. According to this view, roughly, moral worth sometimes requires                         
being motivated by the knowledge that an act is right while desiring that the act promote ends that                                   
merit proper moral concern, like honesty or justice. I think the argument’s I’ve proposed here show                               
the promise of thinking of moral worth along these lines.  21
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